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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In Payton v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that the warrantless
arrest of an individual within the home is prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment.2 Its decision, however, did not disturb earlier rulings that warrant-
less arrests could be made within the home under "exigent
circumstances." 3 Thus, under United States v. Santana,4 police may arrest
an individual without a warrant when the suspect takes refuge in his house
as the police arrive. Similarly, under Warden v. Hayden,' if in "hot pur-
suit" of a fleeing felon, the police may follow him into his home, conduct a
limited "protective" search, and make a warrantless arrest. Once the sus-
pect has been arrested, Chimel v. California6 establishes that the person
and the area within his immediate control may be searched without a war-
rant as an incident to the arrest. Police may seize weapons, instrumentali-
ties of crime, and destructible evidence.'
The cases involving warrantless arrests, searches under "exigent circum-
stances", and those involving searches incident to lawful arrests have
spawned some confusion as to the permissible scope of warrantless
searches upon the arrest of a defendant within the home. In Warden v.
Hayden,8 the Supreme Court approved the seizure of items during a war-
rantless search of the entire house before and contemporaneous with the
defendant's arrest.9 The Court found that the police were justified in
1. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
2. Id at 590.
3. In Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set forth five material considerations in
determining whether exigent circumstances exist:
(1) a grave offense is involved; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) a clear showing of probable cause to believe the suspect committed the offense;
(4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a
likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended.
Id at 392-93.
4. 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976).
5. 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
6. 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
7. Id. at 763.
8. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
9. Id at 298-300. In Warden, the police, while in "hot pursuit" of an armed robbery
suspect, entered a house where the suspect had apparently fled. The police separated and
Catholic University Law Review
searching wherever the suspect or weapons might be hidden. Items inad-
vertently found during that search could legitimately be seized. Thus, War-
den can be read as allowing a protective search before and
contemporaneous with a defendant's arrest. Once the suspect has been ar-
rested, however, Chime! indicates that the police may only search the area
within the defendant's immediate control.
In Ruth v. United States,'° the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
refused to adopt such an interpretation of Warden and Chimel. After two
victims were beaten and shot by two men, the police were directed to de-
fendant's home by a gas station attendant." As they approached Ruth's
house, the police saw defendant Ruth in an illuminated room on the
second floor, placing something behind a dresser. A woman was seen in
the room with him.' 2 When the defendant's uncle answered the front door,
the police immediately entered, seized Ruth, and after spotting Ruth's ac-
complice in a nearby room, seized him.' 3 The police took both men
outside for a show-up and, after they were positively identified by an eye-
witness, placed them under arrest.' 4 The police then reentered the house,
went to the second floor room where they had previously observed the
defendant, and conducted a search. They seized certain items of blood-
stained clothing from the room, and a blood-stained bag of money found
behind the dresser.' 5 After returning later with a search warrant, the police
conducted a more thorough search and seized additional items. 6 Defend-
ant challenged both searches, arguing that the first search was unlawful,
because no exigent circumstances remained after he and his accomplice
had been arrested, and that the second search was also unlawful because
the warrant had been based on evidence illegally seized during the first
search. "
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed.'" Relying primar-
began searching the house. Several officers found the suspect "asleep" upstairs and arrested
him while others, in their simultaneous search for the "man or money" downstairs, seized
clothes, of the type the suspect had allegedly worn, from a cellar washing machine. More-
over, incident to the suspect's arrest upstairs, the police conducted a rapid search and found
a pistol in the flush tank of the upstairs toilet; a clip of ammunition for the pistol under the
suspect's mattress, and ammunition for the gun in a dresser drawer in the suspect's room.
10. 438 A.2d 1256 (D.C. 1981).




15. Id at 1258-59.
16. Id at 1259.
17. Id
18. Id at 1260.
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ily on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in United States v. Miller 9 and its own decision in Vance
v. United States,20 the court refused to interpret Warden as allowing war-
rantless searches within the home only prior to or immediately contempo-
raneous with an arrest. In Miller, the circuit court upheld the search of an
entire dentist's suite even though the police had apprehended the defend-
ant immediately upon entering.2 In Vance, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld the search of a back bedroom after the defend-
ants had been arrested.22 Thus, the court of appeals was persuaded that the
search in Ruth was similarly valid. It particularly emphasized such factors
as the police having observed the defendant place something behind the
dresser, their seeing another person in the room with him, and, the police
not finding any weapons on the defendant and his accomplice when appre-
hended (although an eyewitness had described them as armed). Under
these circumstances, the court determined that the limited search for and
seizure of items in the bedroom upstairs was a legitimate warrantless
search while in "hot pursuit" of Ruth and his accomplice.23
Judge Mack, in dissent, strongly disagreed with the majority's holding
that the police search could be justified under the theory of "hot pursuit."
Once the suspects were placed under arrest, the police were no longer in
"hot pursuit." Moreover, since the police made no attempt to frisk the wo-
man seen upstairs with Ruth, and since they searched what was immedi-
ately apparent as a vacant bedroom, their search could not be
characterized as the limited protective search authorized by Warden .24 Nor
were any of the items sufficiently within the defendant's control to trigger
the Chimel type warrantless search incident to arrest. 25 Finally, because
the defendant posed no danger once arrested, and because the presence of
police at the house eliminated any danger of evidence being destroyed, the
search could not be justified as an emergency search conducted under "exi-
gent circumstances."
26
The court's holding in Ruth seems to expand the scope of warrantless
searches authorized by Warden. The Supreme Court in Warden approved
a warrantless search made immediately before and contemporaneous with
19. 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
20. 399 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1979).
21. Miller, 449 F.2d at 977.
22. Vance, 399 A.2d at 58.
23. Ruth, 438 A.2d at 1260.
24. Id at 1263.
25. Id
26. Id (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).
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the defendant's arrest. The basis for the Court's decision in Warden was
that:
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay
in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endan-
ger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and
only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons
could have insured that. . . the police had control of all weapons
which could be used against them or to effect an escape.
These considerations are altogether absent in Ruth .28 The police neither
suspected nor searched for other suspects; the two known suspects had
been arrested before the search and were incapable of doing any harm.
Indeed, the one person whom it was logical to suppose might still endanger
them, the woman who had been seen in the room with defendant Ruth,
was at no time searched by the police. The court's reading of Warden,
therefore, seems inaccurate. The protective search allowed when in "hot
pursuit" of a fleeing felon does not seem authorized where the defendant
has been arrested and is incapable of harming the police or destroying any
evidence. Moreover, Chime? instructs that only those areas within the de-
fendant's immediate control may be searched incident to his arrest. 29 By
characterizing this post-arrest search of the entire house as conducted
while in "hot pursuit," the court of appeals has undermined the Chimel
holding. Judge Mack, in his dissent, seems correct in concluding that "the
majority's sanctioning conduct under the umbrella of 'exigent circum-
stances' . does violence to the Fourth Amendment.,
30
II. GRAND JURY
The grand jury is charged with supervising "the enforcement of law and
order, the preservation and protections of morals and social order, and the
care of bringing to light for examination, trial, and punishment all vio-
lence, outrages, and indecencies."'" It has been said that the most valuable
function of the grand jury, however, is to act as a buffer between the prose-
cutor and the accused. 32 To this end, the panel is given broad investigatory
power to determine as accurately as possible whether an individual has
actually committed the crime of which he is suspected. 33
27. Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
28. 438 A.2d at 1258-59.
29. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
30. 438 A.2d at 1263.
31. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury § 26 (1968).
32. Id (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1952)).
33. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury § 26 (1968). See also United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d
650 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960).
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Nevertheless, the grand jury's power is not unlimited. In In re Kelley,34
for example, the Distict of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
used its indirect supervisory power over the grand jury to restrict the en-
forcement of the panel's subpoena power. Kelley had been called to testify
before the grand jury with regard to an investigation of suspected arson.
While there, he was served with a grand jury directive to appear in a line-
up later that day. As Kelly had neither been indicted nor arrested at that
time, he challenged the constitutionality of the directive. 35 At a subsequent
hearing, Kelley's attorney argued that the government was required by the
fourth amendment to show some reasonable basis for linking Kelly with
the arson before it could so intrusively interfere with his right of privacy.36
The government argued that no such showing was required to enforce the
directive.3 When the trial judge agreed, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals initially affirmed that ruling.3"
In its first decision, the court of appeals relied on two Supreme Court
cases, United States v. Dioniio39 and United States v. Mara,4 as disposi-
tive of the issue. The Supreme Court had approved grand jury subpoenas
of a voice recording in Dionisio and handwriting exemplars in Mara.4
The Court had reasoned that defendants' fourth amendment privacy inter-
ests were not offended by being compelled to produce that which they
"knowingly exposed to the public" everyday.42 Thus, in seeking to enforce
these grand jury subpoenas, the government had no duty to make a show-
ing of the subpoenas' "reasonableness." The court of appeals found that
line-ups were no different from voice recordings or handwriting exemplars
for constitutional purposes. Indeed, it interpreted the two Supreme Court
decisions as approving grand jury subpoenas for any evidence of a "physi-
cal characteristic" that is "constantly exposed to the public. '43 Thus, it
34. 433 A.2d 704 (D.C. 1981).
35. Id at 705. In fact, Kelley was at no time indicted or arrested on any criminal
charge.
36. Id
37. Id The only fact that the government proffered at the hearing was that one eyewit-
ness had seen the perpetrator of the arson throw a "Molotov cocktail" through the com-
plainant's window.
38. In re Kelley, No. 79-1045, slip op. (D.C. Feb. 8, 1980).
39. 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (no preliminary showing of reasonableness necessary to enforce a
grand jury subpoena for voice recordings).
40. 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (no preliminary showing of reasonableness necessary to enforce a
grand jury subpoena for handwriting exemplars).
41. 410 U.S. at 14, 21.
42. 410 U.S. at 14 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
43. In re Kelley, No. 79-1045, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Feb. 8, 1980) (quoting United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. at 21).
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ruled that the government need not show any reasonable nexus between an
unindicted suspect and the crime, before it could, through a grand jury
directive, compel him to appear at a line-up."
The court of appeals subsequently vacated its decision and, sitting en
banc, reached a different result.45 It began its analysis by citing its 1971
decision in Wise v. Murphy.4 6 There, the court had ruled that, to procure a
line-up order from the court, an investigatory officer must articulate why
the line-up order is reasonable.47 The court noted that the government had
since placed that decision in "mothballs."48 Rather than applying to the
court directly for a line-up order, the government had relied on the Dion-
isio and Mara decisions, and "passed through" police requests for line-ups
to the grand jury.4 9 By issuing line-up requests through grand jury direc-
tives rather than by court order, the government successfully avoided the
necessity of a "reasonableness" showing as required by Wise."
The court disapproved of this evasive tactic. It disagreed primarily with
its earlier conclusion that line-ups were no more constitutionally intrusive
than voice or handwriting samples; line-ups involved greater humiliation,
stigma, and risk of misidentification. However, the court determined that
its decision should be made on nonconstitutional grounds. The court in-
voked its inherent supervisory power over the superior court, which in turn
supervises the grand jury, to require a minimal showing of reasonableness
when the government attempts to enforce a grand jury directive.51 The
court was concerned with the government's evasion of a "reasonableness"
showing by using the grand jury to obtain line-up directives. It pointed out
that in so doing, the government threatened to commingle the separate
responsibilities of grand jury, prosecutor, and judge.52 If not actually in-
volving abuse, this system certainly created the possibility of abuse and, at
44. In re Kelly, No. 79-1045, at 10.
45. Kelley, 433 A.2d at 707.
46. 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. 1971).
47. Kelley, 433 A.2d at 706. The court noted that in light of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), the Wise court had reduced the former requirement in the District of Columbia that
an investigating officer show that he had probable cause to arrest before he could obtain a
line-up order.
48. Kelley, 433 A.2d at 706.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 707. The court emphasized that its standard covered the enforcement rather
than the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. It was only when the government invoked the
judiciary's assistance, with its contempt power, that it was required to show that the directive
was issued for a proper purpose. Id at 709.
52. Id at 707.
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the very least, gave an appearance of impropriety.53 Consequently, in or-
der to ensure that the government and grand jury act in good faith, the
court held that when seeking enforcement of a grand jury directive to ap-
pear in a line up, the government must make a "minimal factual showing
sufficient to permit the judge to conclude that there is a reason for the line-
up which is consistent with the legitimate function of the grand jury."54
Thus, in Kelley, the court of appeals required a showing of "proper pur-
pose" before a grand jury line-up directive would be judicially enforced.
The standard seems sound as it requires a good faith showing that the
grand jury system is not being used to harass a suspect. This allows imme-
diately the grand jury to fulfill its "historic role as a protective bulwark
. . . between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor," 5 while
not restricting its investigatory power by requiring something akin to proof
of misconduct before it can order a suspect to attend a line-up. Moreover,
because the "proper purpose" standard is similar to the "reasonableness"
requirement of Wise, the government will now have little incentive to pass
line-up requests through the grand jury rather than to directly petition the
court.
III. JOINDER/SEVERANCE
Where a court is presented with a criminal case involving either multiple
defendants or multiple offenses, the challenge of joinder and severance is
raised. In determining whether to try each offense separately, a court must
weigh the competing interests. The state seeks judicial efficiency through a
single trial of multiple defendants and offenses. Balanced against the
state's interest is the defendant's desire to be free from unwarranted
prejudice caused by joinder of charges 6 or defendants.57
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently made important
rulings on the issues of severing trials of multiple defendants58 and of-
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id. at 707 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17-18).
56. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). There is no possibility of
such prejudice where evidence of the crimes is simple and distinct. Dunaway v. United
States, 205 F.2d 23, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
57. See Rhone v. United States, 365 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Dawson, Joint
Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases. An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MIcH.
L. REv. 1379 (1979).
58. Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496 (D.C.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 295 (1981);
Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d 447 (D.C. 1981) (allegations of error for pretrial denial of
motion to sever and for failure to grant mistrial after prejudicial testimony elicited during
trial).
1982]
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fenses,59 and has delineated the scope of discovery within the discretion of
a trial judge to decide a motion to sever.60
Severance of trial of a single defendant accused of two crimes was ad-
dressed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Winestock v.
United States.6' At trial, the accused asserted it was improper to join, in an
indictment, two robbery counts where the alleged actions occurred an hour
apart in the same neighborhood. The rationale underlying the motion to
sever was that evidence concerning each separate robbery would not be
automatically admissible at separate trials of the two crimes.6 2 The defend-
ant argued that the differences between the circumstances surrounding
each robbery were greater than the similarities. The formal motion re-
questing severance claimed that the counts had been improperly joined
under Superior Court Rule 8(a).63
The court of appeals instructed that the standard for proper joinder of
offenses in an indictment was whether the offenses were of the same or
similar nature.' Whether evidence offered on each crime would be recip-
rocally admissible at a trial of the other crime was irrelevant in examining
a motion to sever under Rule 8(a). The court did note, however, that recip-
rocal admissibility would be a proper consideration when a pretrial motion
to sever was brought pursuant to Rule 14.65 Nevertheless, because the ap-
59. Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1981).
60. United States v. Jones, 438 A.2d 444 (D.C. 1981).
61. 429 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1981).
62. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In that case the court set
forth five issues for which similar crimes evidence would be admissible. The court explained
that such evidence is relevant when it concerns "(1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of
mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other, and
(5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial." Id at 90.
In Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981), the defendant urged at retrial that the
trial court should have severed the trials of the three rapes for which he had been convicted.
The court of appeals held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny the
severance motion since the evidence for each rape would have been admissible at the trials
of the other two. The court found that since circumstances surrounding each were so distinc-
tively similar, the evidence would have been admissible based on the issue of identity, the
last Drew exception. Id at 832.
63. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CRIM.R. 8(a); see generally, Note, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965).
64. 429 A.2d 519, 524 (D.C. 1981); 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.04(2) at 8-14
(1980).
65. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CRIM.R. 14. Denial of a Rule 14 motion to sever may be ap-
pealed on grounds of abuse of trial court discretion where evidence of such abuse is properly
preserved.
For another example of Rule 14's application, see United States v. Jones, 438 A.2d 444
(D.C. 1981). Rule 14 provides: "In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court
may order the prosecution to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
[Vol. 31:777
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pellant had based the appeal solely on Rule 8(a), and had not preserved
Rule 14 grounds for relief in the record of trial, the court of appeals re-
jected the argument and upheld the trial court.
In Sweet v. United States,66 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considered the appellants' assertion that the trial court had erred in deny-
ing their motions to sever. Appealing convictions of kidnapping, armed
robbery, and assault with intent to commit rape, both defendants claimed
that separate trials should have been ordered. The appeal was based on the
argument that at trial, the defendants had presented conflicting defenses of
alibi and coercion, and the weight of evidence against each was so dispro-
portionate as to permit a conviction solely on the basis of guilt by associa-
tion. One appellant also argued that severance should have been ordered
during trial after a defendant testified concerning one of appellant's prior
convictions.
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the appellants' motions to sever. It specified that severance
must be ordered only when the defendants' defenses are so inconsistent
that the jury would conclude that both defendants were guilty by merely
considering the facts alone.67 The court held that there could be no such
prejudice against these defendants since there was other strong incriminat-
ing evidence against each defendant and the jury had been instructed to
compartmentalize the evidence as to each defendant.
Furthermore, no error was found regarding the weight of the evidence
against each defendant. The court of appeals ruled that severance should
only be granted where one defendant's involvement in a joint act is de
minimus.68 The court noted, moreover, that the jury could not have con-
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence
at trial." In Jones, the trial court requested the government to produce statements made by
one of the two defendants to a private citizen. The statements were to be inspected in camera
to consider defendant severance under Rule 14 as requested by the other accused.
After the inspection, the trial court ordered oral argument on the severance issue. Conse-
quently, the government was directed to provide the statements to the defense to allow for
proper preparation for argument. 438 A.2d at 447. This order ran counter to the holding of
Heighligh v. United States, 379 A.2d 689 (D.C. 1979) (statement by defendant for trial prep-
aration). Additionally, the prosecution argued that such production would jeopardize wit-
ness safety and that the trial court lacked authority to order oral argument. In response, the
trial court prohibited the government from introducing any of the defendant's statements to
private citizens. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concurred with the prosecution's
argument that the trial court had abused its discretion. 438 A.2d at 447.
66. 438 A.2d 447 (D.C. 1981).
67. Id at 451. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368 n.ll (D.C. 1979);
Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 1978).
68. Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d at 451 (quoting Christian v. United States, 394
A.2d 1, 21 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979)).
19821
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victed appellants on the basis of guilt by association since both defendants
were not convicted of all charges.
69
Additionally, the court of appeals found no error in the trial court's de-
nial of one defendant's motion for mistrial and severance. At trial, the ac-
cused submitted the motion following testimony concerning his prior
conviction; the testimony was given by the codefendant. In sustaining the
ruling, the court of appeals held that the purpose of the evidence offered
was to demonstrate the witness' innocence and not to associate the previ-
ously convicted defendant in wrongdoing. The testimony, therefore, lacked
prejudice sufficient to require it to be stricken.7" The appellate court thus
distinguished this case from those where inadmissible evidence had been
introduced by the government for the purpose of implicating the defend-
ant.7 ' It is important to note, however, that in this case the government had
provided other evidence sufficient to convict the defendant.72
In an en banc hearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit considered whether one defendant's impeach-
ment prejudicially implicated the codefendant. In Carpenter v. United
States,73 two defendants were tried for second-degree burglary, grand lar-
ceny, and destruction of property. Defendant Kitching was the subject of
impeachment. On appeal, defendant Carpenter argued that the trial court's
denial of his severance motion after the government announced that it in-
tended to use the impeaching statement was an abuse of discretion. After
discussing a trial judge's alternatives for curtailing the inherent prejudice
of such statements, 74 the court of appeals upheld the lower court's decision
that the government's attempt to sanitize the statement was sufficient.
69. 438 A.2d 447, 451. This issue was also presented in Carpenter, 430 A.2d 496 (D.C.
1981).
70. 438 A.2d at 453. See, e.g., Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522, 528 (D.C. 1978)
(prosecutor's questioning of defendant about his prior conviction for possession of an unre-
gistered firearm immediately after defendant denied instant charge of carrying a pistol with-
out a license deemed by the court to be a "highly suggestive and prejudicial sequence" of
questioning requiring reversal of conviction).
71. See, e.g., Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1978); United States v. Carter,
482 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72. Sweet, 438 A.2d at 453.
73. 430 A.2d 496 (D.C. 1981).
74. Id at 501-05. See Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036 (D.C. 1979). The alterna-
tives are redaction, where the trial court substitutes words with lesser prejudicial effect such
as "codefendant" for "accomplice," exclusion from the statement of any reference to the
codefendant or severance of trials. Sometimes the admission of the statement with limiting
instructions is deemed to be a fourth alternative available to the judge. See Carpenter v.
United States, 430 A.2d at 505. But see id at 509 (Ferren, J., concurring) (fourth option is
impermissible because of inherent prejudice in statement).
75. The officer who testified to rebut defendant Kitching's denial of making the state-
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The appellant also alleged error in the trial court's denial of his motion for
a mistrial when, after Kitching denied making a prior statement incrimi-
nating himself and appellant, a police officer testified that such a statement
was made. The trial court responded with an immediate cautionary in-
struction and repeated the instruction in its general charge to the jury. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that this was an appropriate
response and that it was sufficient to negate the prejudicial effect to the
appellant.
Carpenter provides a procedural framework for trial judges to analyze
the competing interests of joined defendants. This scheme requires the trial
judge to decide initially whether, as an alternative to granting severance,
any prejudice to the defendant can be cured through the omission or re-
daction of the incriminating statement. In the event that redaction is inef-
fective, the trial judge may then determine whether limiting instructions
would cure the prejudice and thus be a viable alternative to granting a
mistrial. In determining the propriety of limiting instructions, a trial court
may consider the nature and quantity of evidence against the defendant.76
Judges Ferren and Kelly concurred in the result but stated that the option
of counteracting prejudicial testimony with limiting instructions was an
insufficient option to maintain the integrity of the trial.7 7 In a separate
opinion,78 Judge Mack agreed that only these three alternatives should be
available to the trial court.
Sweet and Carpenter are controversial decisions. Since the court in
Sweet concentrated on the party eliciting the prejudicial evidence, as well
as the purpose for its introduction, it did not reach the issue of the propri-
ety of cautionary instructions in curing prejudice to a defendant. The
Sweet court found no prejudice based on its finding that the prejudicial
statement was elicited by counsel for another defendant, that the statement
was not offered to prejudice appellant, and that there was other substantial
evidence linking defendant to the crime. In Carpenter, the government
elicited the prejudicial statement through the rebuttal testimony of one of
the officers.
As Judge Mack observed in Carpenter, and applicable as well to Sweet,
ments changed an explicit reference in pretrial proceedings to "Carpenter" to a reference at
trial to the "codefendant." 430 A.2d at 499-500 n.3.
76. 430 A.2d at 506.
77. Id at 509-11.
78. Id at 511. Judge Mack concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed with the
other judges concerning the three alternatives of redaction, severance, or exclusion where
one defendant's statements implicate a codefendant. The dissent viewed admission of the
prejudicial statement as requiring reversal of Carpenter's conviction; prejudice to Carpenter
could not be cured by a limiting instruction. Id at 512.
1982]
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the origin of and reason for the prejudicial statement is irrelevant with
respect to whether a defendant has been prejudiced once the jury has
heard the evidence. Other considerations forwarded by Judge Mack in
Carpenter are well reasoned. Writing with specific reference to the facts in
Carpenter, she noted that Kitching's statement provided the sole evidence
of Carpenter's actual presence in the burglarized store and that the other
evidence against Carpenter was only circumstantial. Thus, the statement of
codefendant Kitching was unfairly prejudicial to Carpenter. Judge Mack's
analysis complies with the court's consideration of the issue in Brabham v.
United States. 
79
Furthermore, Judge Mack challenges the effectiveness of a trial judge's
cautionary instructions in eliminating the prejudice to the defendant. Cit-
ing Bruton v. United States, ° she notes, "too often such admonition
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors."
Despite that the "possibility of inadmissible testimony being uttered inad-
vertently in front of the jury is a constant but acceptable risk inherent in all
oral testimony,"'" Judge Mack stressed that this is not a risk that should
fall on the defendant. Rather, the government should bear the burden of
testimony going awry when it chooses redaction instead of omission.82 At
the heart of her opinion is a recognition that the government's position is
originally more favorable since it is in possession of the statement and has
the choice of proposing a redaction or omission of the reference to a de-
fendant. In the event that redaction of the incriminating statement falters,
the defendant's only course of conduct is to move for a mistrial.8 3
The most important consideration in cases such as Sweet and Carpenter
is minimizing the prejudice to the defendant from his codefendant's testi-
mony. Where the statement adds little to the evidence in an already strong
case against that defendant, a cautionary instruction will be sufficient;
where such statements bolster an otherwise weak case or one, such as in
Carpenter, with only circumstantial evidence linking a defendant to a
79. 326 A.2d 254 (D.C. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975). In this case, the D.C.
Court of Appeals held that cautionary instructions are inappropriate where "(1) the state-
ment . . . directly implicates the [defendant]; (2) [was] made by one whose interest is ad-
versely affected and who is not a government informant, and (3) the statement itself is as
'powerfully incriminating' as a confession [and] there must [also] be no independent evi-
dence of guilt."
80. 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (quoting Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
81. 430 A.2d at 511 (quoting majority opinion at 505-06).
82. Id at 512.
83. Id at 513.
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crime, limiting instructions will not serve to protect adequately the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.
IV. STATEMENTS
In Miranda v. Arizona,8" the Supreme Court held that in the context of
"custodial interrogation," certain procedural safeguards must be followed
in order to protect the defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Thus, no statements made by the defendant
during "custodial interrogation" may be used unless he has been warned
that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.
8 5
Subsequent court decisions, in determining whether Miranda warnings are
required, have focused on the meaning of "custody" 6 and
"interrogation.""7
In Rhode Island v. Innis,"8 the Supreme Court, for the first time, ad-
dressed the issue of "interrogation." Defendant had been arrested on
charges of kidnapping, robbery, and murder, and after being given his Mi-
randa warnings, requested to speak with a lawyer.8 9 Although the victim
had been murdered with a sawed off shotgun, the murder weapon was not
discovered with the defendant at his arrest. Several policemen, therefore,
converged on the area to search, and the captain ordered the defendant to
be driven to the police station.9° On the way to the station, one police
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. Id. at 479.
86. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (defendant not in cus-
tody when voluntarily came to police station, was not arrested, and was allowed to leave
after talking with police); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (defendant in custody be-
cause not free to leave when police entered his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. and questioned him);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant in custody at police station or whenever
deprived of freedom of action in any significant way).
In 1981, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that the police did not hold
the defendants in custody when they came to the defendants' apartment to question them
about a crime in which the defendants had been the victims and, while there, inadvertently
saw firearms. See United States v. Ward, 438 A.2d 201 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam). See also
United States v. Allen, 436 A.2d 1303 (D.C. 1981) (defendant not in custody when asked to
sit in police car before being questioned as witness to a crime).
87. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
88. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
89. Id at 294.
90. Id at 294-95.
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officer remarked to the other that, because there was a school for handi-
capped children nearby, "God forbid one of them might find a weapon
with shells and. . . hurt [himselfl."' Defendant then interrupted the con-
versation and offered to show the officers where the shotgun was.92 In rul-
ing that the officers' conversation was not interrogation, the Court clarified
the meaning of the term. "Interrogation" included not only express ques-
tioning, but "the functional equivalent" of questioning. 93 Thus, it included
"any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."94
In Robertson v. United States,95 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals applied Innis to determine whether the defendant had been subject
to interrogation. Defendant had been arrested in his home on charges of
embezzlement.96 When two police officers appeared at his apartment, he
invited them in and was arrested. One officer then said, "do you know why
I'm here?," whereupon defendant immediately began to explain that he
had been "ripped ofi" by his employer.97 Although the officer interrupted
him and gave him his Miranda warnings, defendant continued to give a
full explanation of his alleged innocence.98 Defendant later moved unsuc-
cessfully to suppress his entire statement as the result of impermissible cus-
todial interrogation.99
The court of appeals upheld defendant's subsequent conviction."° App-
lying Innis, the court determined that the officer's comment, taken in con-
text, would not normally elicit an incriminating response.' Therefore, it
could not be said that the officer "should have known" that he was reason-
ably likely to evoke an incriminating answer."2 Thus, defendant had not
been subject to interrogation. The court, however, did not conclude that
Miranda warnings were unnecessary because no custodial interrogation
took place. In light of the fact that the warnings had been given, it ruled
that defendant had voluntarily waived his right to remain silent when he
91. Id at 295.
92. Id
93. Id at 300-01.
94. Id at 301.
95. 429 A.2d 192 (D.C. 1981).




100. Id at 196.




continued with his statement after being warned of his rights.' 0 3 He there-
fore deserved no relief as he had voluntarily waived the Miranda protec-
tion to which he would otherwise be entitled.' °4
Although the court's decision in Robertson falls squarely within the
Supreme Court's definition of "interrogation," its analysis is nevertheless
somewhat confused. Two problems arise whenever Miranda warnings are
at issue. The first concerns the point at which the warnings must be given;
they must be given when the defendant is subject to "custodial interroga-
tion.' 0 5 The issue in Robertson was whether the officer's comment was
"interrogation" and therefore impermissible because the defendant had
not been issued his warnings before the comment was made. The second
problem, found in Innis, arises when Miranda warnings are given and the
police continue to interrogate the defendant in derogation of his right to
remain silent until consultation with an attorney. In Innis, the defendant
had been given his Miranda warnings and indicated that he wished to re-
main silent. And, it was only in deciding whether the police had unconsti-
tutionally continued to question defendant, that the Supreme Court had to
determine the meaning of "interrogation."
Therefore, to the extent that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
based its holding on Robertson's alleged waiver of his right to remain si-
lent, its premise was incorrect. The only relevant factor in Robertson was
whether the police had begun interrogating the defendant before they is-
sued him his warnings. To the extent, however, that the court based its
holding on the fact that no interrogation had taken place and no warnings
were required, its decision carefully follows the Supreme Court's definition
of "interrogation" and appears sound.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals directly addressed whether
the police had impermissibly continued interrogation in derogation of de-
fendant's rights in United States v. Alexander. °6 There, police were called
to aid a Woman who was lying stabbed and unconscious on the sidewalk.
After the defendant and her two daughters were taken to the station for
questioning, one of defendant's daughters implicated defendant in the
stabbing.' °7 Defendant was then formally arrested and given her Miranda
warnings. She indicated that she wished to remain silent until she had con-
sulted with an attorney.0 8 Shortly thereafter, however, a police officer
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
106. 428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981).
107. Id at 44-45.
108. Id at 45.
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warned her that he knew that she had been responsible for the stabbing
and that she was going to jail. He then began filling out a form in front of
her which he explained was the paperwork necessary to send her to jail. 1
09
A few minutes later, defendant said that she wished to explain the events
of the morning. When Miranda warnings were reissued, the defendant
stated that, although she understood her rights, she wished to speak with-
out an attorney present. She then gave a full confession."' At the subse-
quent suppression hearing, the trial judge determined that her statements
had been voluntarily given and allowed their introduction at trial."'I
The court of appeals disagreed. Guided by the Supreme Court's decision
in Michigan v. Mosley,' 12 the court determined that defendant's exercise of
her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had not been
"scrupulously honored" by the police." 3 In Mosley, defendant had been
arrested for robbery and, upon receiving his Miranda warnings, refused to
answer any questions. At no time, however, did he ask to consult with an
attorney. "' Two hours later, he was taken to another section of the police
station and questioned by a different detective about an unrelated murder.
Although defendant was reissued his Miranda warnings before being ques-
tioned about the murder, he made a statement that implicated him in the
homicide." 5 He was convicted of the murder after the inculpatory state-
ment made during the interrogation was introduced at his trial. The
Supreme Court was persuaded that Mosley's rights had been "scrupu-
lously honored" because (1) interrogation ceased when he requested it to
do so; (2) there was a significant break before he was questioned on an
unrelated matter; (3) the parties, place, and subject matter of the interroga-
tion had changed; (4) new Miranda warnings were given before the second
interrogation; and (5) his previous request to remain silent was not under-
mined because the second questioning involved a different offense. 16
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pointed out, the situation
in Alexander stood in stark contrast to the Mosley case. In Alexander, in-
terrogation continued after defendant requested a lawyer; without making
any attempt to find her a lawyer, the same police officer returned with
another form and immediately advised defendant that he knew of her
guilt; the parties, place, and subject matter were identical; no new Miranda
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id at 47.
112. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
113. Alexander, 428 A.2d at 50.
114. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 97.
115. Id at 98.
116. Id at 104-05.
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warnings were given until defendant was well into her statement; and her
exercise of rights was directly violated by resumed interrogation on the
same offense.' 1 7 Under the Mosley guidelines, the Alexander court con-
cluded that the defendant's exercise of rights had not been "scrupulously
honored." ' Because the police conduct had deprived defendant of her
constitutional protection under the fifth amendment, it was irrelevant
whether, after the misconduct, any of her statements could be character-
ized as voluntary. 1 9
The court's analysis in this case reflects the letter and spirit of Mosley. It
determined that it must first examine whether defendant's exercise of
rights had been "scrupulously honored" by the police before it looked at
her ensuing statements. Thus, it implicitly rejected any notion that the ini-
tial taint created by police misconduct would be vitiated by the voluntary
nature of any statements defendant subsequently made. It was insufficient
that the police reissued Miranda warnings, and were assured that defend-
ant clearly understood her rights before allowing her to complete her in-
culpatory statement. The court's method of analysis is in keeping with
protections intended by the Miranda warnings. The warnings were consid-
ered necessary to protect an individual from the inherently coersive envi-
ronment of custodial interrogation. The efficacy of the warnings would be
significantly undermined if the police could compel an individual to speak
and thereafter characterize his statements as "voluntary" simply because
Miranda warnings were reissued. Once an individual feels compelled to
speak, the reiterated warnings are probably unlikely to make him recon-
sider. Thus, it is crucial that the police "scrupulously honor" the defend-
ant's right to remain silent. Only after passing this threshold test can the
police reasonably argue that statements subsequently made by the defend-
ant are not the product of coercion.
Valerie Stanley
117. Alexander, 428 A.2d at 50-51.
118. Id at 50.
119. Id.
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